Issue 4 of Avidya vritti

The intelligibility of the analytic and synthetic distinction between the modes and dimensions of avidya formulates a post-priori opinion that the subject presumes justifiable introspection in its own premises. Such post priori resolution in the revision of avidya claims that both the dimensions we observed vide, anupalabdhi and the anyathajana would well be considered anaphoric as they co-refer avidya. In other words avidya is the antecedent for anupalabdhi and anyathAjnAna. Here, though the referents does not directly refer to the subject (avidya ), they inherit the expressions of the same as its dimensions, entailing it to be considered as a quantifier also. Semantically the referents and the quantifiers are mutually dependant. This type of argument I believe is canonical with the relevance to the manner in which mimamsakas handle the issue. ie, avidya to mimamsakas I suppose would mean the knowledge of non existence (imposing reality to something other than Brahman – the ultimate reality). The very entity of non existence to mimansakas is based upon two sub functionalities. One is the relational functionality and other the reciprocal functionality. To fit in the above argument, we may place anyathAjnAna to be akin to former and the anupalabhdhi to that of the latter. The knowledge of non existence would apparently involve the objectivity of the existence of a subject. In this case it is important that we keep in mind that though the knowledge of existence sustains in place for the knowledge of non existence, the knowledge of relative existence fails to persist. This indeed is a simple axiomatic logic which deduces to establish avidya to be a peripheral entity that is active at the brink of reality. It is evident because in abstract the uttara mimamsakas assert that those that are perceptible are real in regard with illusoriness and not otherwise. Brahman, as always arbitrarily holds the numero uno status, is without a second thence remaining intact. The question on the degree of intelligibility plays a pivotal role to settle the contention. When the degree of intelligibility of reality is real then the knowledge of unreality diminishes and vise versa. Regretting for the verbiage I employ, it would not be wrong to further characterize these factorials as savikalpa and nirvikalpa. Savikalpa is one that is determinant and nirvikalpa is the indeterminate factor which corresponds to the anyathAjnAna and the anupalabdhi respectively. The elementary treatises of mimamsakas clearly states that the real cognition alone is intelligible and the absolute non reality is unintelligible. They also attempt to establish the rejection of ‘non established qualification’ to illusoriness by eliminating the fallacy of detachment to both real and unreal domains. The line of thought continues to extend as yet to be a skeptical argument with the metaphysical necessity, claiming logical didactic arguments and rejecting intentionality on the subject. Rules of arguments emphasize that the conditionals with the premises as antecedent and the conclusion as consequent is necessarily a posteriori and not a priori which becomes true with our case. The western hypothesis on the theory of arguments and validation of any subject states that if the two-dimensional ( anupalabdhi & anyathAjnAna ) explanation of a posteriori (degree of intelligibility ) is correct, the appropriate supplementation ( attributing savikalpa & nirvikalpa postulates ) of the premises by contextual information ( uttara mimamsa quotes ) will result in a set of premises that leads to a priori towards conclusion. Determination of that conclusive priori, towards a tangible conclusion evolves more crucial conditional premises accommodating more logical introspections.

Avidya vritti will continue …